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THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
( Mr J'. f\lJ RCBACJ rr;R) 
The result of three monetary crises in 1971, two the year after and two 
more in 1973 has been the, now undeniable, collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system. These crises have also had other consequences, some obvious and 
some more implicit, though no less important. 
For example, the fixed parity system is undoubtedly no more; banks are no 
longer obliged to acquire dollars or third country currencies and no singl~ 
currency can now be regarded as the pole star by which the monetary system 
takes its bearings. 
·Alongside these essentially technical consequences, there are some which 
are more specifically political in their implications: for example, the 
monetary upheaval has certainly convinced members that the community itself 
needs strengthening - the joint float of Member States' currencies vis-·a-vis 
the rest of the world and the further development of the monetary fund are 
the visible signs of the move in this direction. 
The CD Group, represented by Prof. Friedrich BURGBACHER, expressed its 
opinion on all these problems in the European Parliament; it regards the 
strengthening of the monetary fund as a positive development, as 
Mr BURGBACHER explicitly stated in the parliamentary debate of 5 June: ''Ihe 
European Monetary F'Und is a necessary institution. It has already been said 
however that, in its present form it is not capable of solving European 
monetary problems. If the fund is to be effective, a great deal more of our 
currency reserves will have to be transferred to it and these will then 
naturally no longer be available for special drawing rights. 
One can only support the desire to include Britain, Ireland and Italy in 
the joint float and the same applies to the strengthening of the powers of 
the monetary fund. But it still has to be decided whether the fund should 
have completely autonomous status, independent of Government control, rather 
like the German Federal Railways, or whether it should be an instrument in 
the hands of the European institutions. I myself, and I think the majori 
of my political friends, incline to the view that the monetary fund should 
be completely independent, because experience has shown that independent 
central banks tend to encourage stability more than dependent ones. The 
question of burning interest to the peoples of our Community is not so much 
what we mean by monetary reform as what we mean by inflation, a situation 
which appears likely to continue. Even in 1973 the following factors 
the return to stability and any further progress towards monetary reform~ 
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1. the increase in U.S. balance of payments rates, for example; 
2. the foreign currency power of the multi-national companies; 
3. the oil dollars already mentioned; there is every prospect that by the 
1980's some 30 thousand million dollars a year will be passing into the 
hands of the countries of the Middle East if oil production continues 
as we foresee, and 
4. deposit money. Deposit money is not bank-notes but credit newly created 
in bank dealings; and it is one of the reasons why money in circulation 
is increasing by some 20% while the gross national product has increased 
by only about 10%. But as long as the volume of money in circulation 
- whether in bank-notes or deposits - increases purchasing power, we 
obviously cannot get to grips with inflation, because with a rising 
business trend, with rising gross national product, with rising growth 
of national production (i.e. the gross national product) this volume of 
money will increase almost automatically and perhaps more than proport-
ionately to the growth of other factors which determine purchasing power. 
These are all questions which are still unsolved and may require measures 
which we cannot imagine today or are not bold enough to consider. This is 
often the case. Each person now thinks of his own interests. We must think 
of everybody and almost everybody will benefit if we return to really stable 
conditions. ' 
Monetary stability requires evidence of good-will not only from Europe but 
also, to a considerable extent, from the United States, once they have a 
balance of payments surplus, and the energy-producing third countries. 
Prof. BURGBACHER freely admitted that both political and economic difficult-
ies arose in this field. 'It is being suggested that all measures which 
restrict trade should be abolished. We are certainly all in favour of free 
trade in a free·world economy. May I nevertheless make an observation? I 
should like to illustrate it with an example which I consider particularly 
relevant. The question as to whether we should continue to tolerate dis-
ruption of the world economy and currencies created by the "oil-dollars" is 
one which requires closer investigation., particularly as this problem is 
becoming increasingly acute, in that the USA and Japan need to buy more oil 
from the Near East than was formerly the case. Here, in my opinion, we are 
faced with a serious alternative: either we do something about the situation, 
which can only mean restriction of consumption, or the oil-producing 
countries will restrict their supplies in which case the energy shortage 
in Europe and the free world will increase more rapidly than is otherwise 
to be feared at present.' 
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COMMITMENT TO A UNITED EUROPE* 
(Mr L. GIRARDIN) 
It has been said - and widely commented in the Press - that the 
Paris Surnmi~ Conference decided that European political, economic and 
social union was to be achieved by 1980. Leaving aside the statements 
contained in the official text, I cannot see that the Nine have taken 
any effective political decision to attain this objective. There is no 
doubt in my mind that the three positive results to emerge from the 
Summit were the decision to set up a European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(a matter already decided in fact at Frascati), the decision to set up a 
Regional Development Fund (here it must be said that it was perhaps 
necessary to await the accession of countries with problems similar to 
our own before certain conclusions could be reached) and the commitment 
to a more vigorous social policy. These are the only precise and 
practical commitments mentioned in the Final Declaration and their 
accomplishment will not be enough to guarantee European union on 
schedule, i.e. by 1980. 
The most disappointing thing about the Summit was that institutional 
issues were passed over and their solution once again postponed. 
As Sicco Mansholt, former President of the Commission of the 
European Communities, once said, Europe is sick. It is still sick after 
the Paris meeting. The Summit has not brought about ariy change in its 
condition. 
In 1975, as we all know, we shall have the first Community budget 
financed entirely from the Community's own resources, i.e. an independent 
budget without any contribution from the Member States. In the circum-
stances, and especially with 1975 so near, to be without a parliament 
endowed with adequate powers and, most important of all, elected by 
direct universal suffrage, se~~s to me, not least from the democratic 
point of view, to place us all in jeopardy. 
In Paris the various governments represented did reach some decisions 
about the Community institutions: they decided to hold on for the time 
being to all the power they have enjoyed hitherto. In fact the Council 
of Ministers (i.e. representatives of national governments), and not the 
European Parliament, has been and will continue to be the Community's 
sole legislative body. The other institutions - in particular the 
Commission and the European Parliament - will be able to go on exerting 
their influence, but without any power of decision in institutional 
matters. 
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That is why we are co~vinced that everything hinges on the political 
resolve which has been expressed and which, we hope, will in due course 
be shown by Member States' governments. Perhaps all we can say for 
certain at this juncture is that European union, when it does come about, 
will not be as envisaged in the Final Cornrnuniqu~: it will be neither a 
federation nor a confederation but something sui generis, possibly a 
political body that has no historical precedent. 
Despite the reservations I have expressed so far, one thing is quite 
certain, namely that the Summit has solemnly declared a united Europe to 
be its ultimate goal. This has already been said on many occasions, but 
what is significant this time is that provision has been made for the 
participation of the Community institutions. I think this can be seen 
as a real guarantee. Consequently, we who are convinced Europeans, and 
especially those of us who are politicians (with the Christian Democrats 
in the vanguard) must continue to fight for a united Europe. 
This is mainly a task for the political and social forces. It is 
unacceptable to us that it should be for the governments representing the 
Member States of the Community to influence Europe's decision-making 
bodies without being subjected to the critical appraisal of the majority 
and opposition parties in each country before they adopt their own 
positions. 
A young people's and workers' Europe, and not just a businessmen•'s 
Europe, can, in my view, only be attained through elections to the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage. If France, the United Kingdom 
and - strangely enough - Brandt's Federal Republic are not in favour of 
direct elections at this juncture, we in Italy (as advocated in a petition 
submitted to the Senate by the Italian branch of the European Movement) 
must take steps, if need be on our own, towards securing the election of 
our delegates to the parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, thus showing the 
way and trying to draw the other Member States into our wake. 
Before bringing my remarks to a close, I should like to dwell on one 
aspect of the problems arising in connection with the ratification of the 
Brussels Treaty. In the Final Declaration issued at, the Paris Summit the 
Member States stated that they regarded economic growth not as an end in 
itself but as a means of securing an improvement in the living standards of 
their peoples. I am convinced that this statement must be taken very 
seriously because at least we have arrived at a stage where the direct 
political resolve exists to progress towards an open social policy. We 
should seize the opportunity because unless we adjust European economic 
integration to social requirements we shall obviously only be lending 
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support to the view that man is the servant of the economy instead of the 
other way round. That is why we must make this effort and do everything 
we can at both the national and the Community level. We should see this 
as a new and greater challenge to the trade unions and social partners in 
the Community. 
*Excerpt from the address given by Mr Luigi GIRARDIN, a member of the 
Christian-Democratic Group of the European Parliament, to the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies on the occasion of the ratification of the accession 
treaties. 
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SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT AID 
(Mr M. DEWULF~ 
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system has undoubtedly been a reduction 
in the importance of the dollar in the international system; the 
crises of the last three years have clearly shown that no national 
currency can any longer assume the burden and privilege of being 
the only reserve asset. 
It does not seem desirable to return to the gold standard 
either since this system favours countries which produce the 
metal. 
The solution seems to be to establish Special Drawing 
Rights, an artificially created international value, to settle 
balance of payments debts. A fair rate of interest, (adapted 
to the market), may be fixed for them, and they may be used to 
intervene on the currency markets as was the dollar at one time. 
Special Drawing Rights are in practice based on the covering 
capital of the monetary reserves of the Comm.unity states: about 
150 thousand million u.a. are set aside to repay Special Drawing 
Rights in convertible currencies. Though this may be a good 
system, or at least the best replacement for the dollar as the 
base currency of the international system, it raises many 
problems. 
Mr Maurice DEWULF pointed out that there was a danger of 
this new system affecting the Community's relations with developing 
countries. A new international monetary order will in fact be 
developed for the introduction of special drawing rights. It 
follows that developing countries will, by definition, only 
receive a very meagre share of this, precisely because they are 
poor. On the other hand we note that the traditional financial 
government aid to the benefit of developing countries is not 
increasing satisfactorily, not only when compared with our 
obligations, but also, chiefly, with an eye to the requirements 
of the developing countries. New financial means will therefore 
have to be made available for this international task. 
At UNCTAD III pressure was mounted, partly on the initiative 
of the Community, for the international monetary fund to make 
.a study of the problem concerning the link that should be 
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introduced between the institution of special drawing rights and 
-~ 
international development aid. 
By 'link' we mean the tie between the allocation of special 
drawing rights and international aid for development. Such 
allocation makes it possible, thanks partly to the interest 
payable, for actual goods to be transferred from the industrial 
countries to the developing countries. In exchange for this 
industrial nations will, however, obtain additional liquidity. 
'We are therefore speaking not of monetary orthodoxy but 
of the financing of actual goods for developing countries. 
Coupled to this is the monetary condition that the industrial 
countries must obtain additional liquidity through the system 
of special drawing rights', said Mr DEWULF. 
The allocation of special drawing rights must naturally 
remain subject to monetary criteria, but this does not detract 
from the fact that they must also be assessed acco~ding to the 
long-term requirement of the world economy for international 
liquidity. 
Now what does this long-term requirement for international 
liquidity by the world economy amount to? Everyone will agree 
that one of the duties of the international Conununity is to 
express itself collectively on the formation of international 
fiduciary reserves. But it must, in fact, also express itself 
on the way these are used, so that conunon objectives can be 
achieved. Harmonious development at world level is one of 
these objectives, and special drawing rights are one of the 
mechanisms serving these objectives. 
'The nee<;! should be recognized,' continued Mr DEWULF, 
'for the European Conununity, as an important partner in the 
Conunittee of Twenty, to propose to the International Monetary 
Fund ways of establishing this link as soon as possible. It 
would not be acceptable for the European Parliament to lag 
behind in this area, in view of the fact that the Conunission 
pronounced a long time ago in favour of this link. I understand 
that this link has already been accepted at ministerial level 
during the prepatory work of the Conunittee of Twenty. We 
must now choose an appropriate system. 
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I feel persra1iy1 , J;iaid Mr DEWULF in conclusion I that we 
should opt for /n organizational link, by which special drawing 
rights allocatfd to the industrial nations will be transferred 
to multilatera\ organizations for their current loans to developing 
countries. ' 
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ACTIVITIES OF CD MEMBERS 
o Mr MARTENS put a written question to the Commission of 
the European Communities asking for details, based on 
the latest statistical data, of the cost of certain items 
of the common agricultural policy, both to the individual 
Member States and to the EAGGF. 
o Irregularities in the organization of the market in 
agricultural products in the EEC occur with unfortunate 
frequency. Mr FELLERMAIER asked the Commission whether 
Member States have made provision at national level for 
adopting measures, based on Community regulations, to 
supplement existing agreements with a view to preventing such 
irregularities. 
o All too often the European Parliament hears of Commission 
documents through press reports, instead of being informed 
directly or even through committee channels. Emphasizing the 
European.Parliament's right of priority to such information, 
Mr NOTENBOOM and Mr SCHOLTEN asked the Commission for an 
explanation. 
o Referring to the world sugar agreement, Mr DEWULF asked the 
Commission to explain the Community position on negotiations on 
the new world sugar agreement to which the Commission has 
been invited. 
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THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF TRAFFIC INFRASTRUCTURES 
by Luigi NOE* 
From the moment the European Economic Community started up its 
activities the EEC Commission at the time expressed the view that joint 
planning was needed for transpo~t projects requiring major investment. 
The European Parliament has always supported this view and has in fact 
extended it by recommending that not only the main lines of communication 
but also the gaps in the transport network at the Community's internal 
frontiers should be given priority treatment. 
The Council of Ministers, however, whittled down the Commission's 
proposals for joint action in the field of transport infrastructures to 
a mere procedure for consultation. The result was 'Council Decision of 
28 February 1966 instituting a procedure for consultation in respect of 
\ 
transport infrastructure investment. 
This procedure for consultation, however, is proving increasingly 
inadequate as it does not really give the Commission any power to act. 
Article 1 of the decision requires Member States merely to notify 
the commission of 'investment projects of community interest before they 
are carried out'. In the case of major investments such as Alpine tunnels 
even more than other transport investments, Community interest should 
begin to assert itself at a far earlier stage than just before the project's 
implementation. Obviously negotiations are much more difficult if they 
only start once a Member State has decided to make a certain investment. 
In the event of a conflict of interests, which would only become 
apparent at this stage, the planning work sometimes of decades might have 
to be abandoned and started all over again. 
A further indication of the inadequacy of the current procedure for 
consultation, and one which becomes particularly apparent in the case of 
Alpine crossings, is the fact that the Community cannot negotiate effective-
ly with third countries by this process. Cooperation should begin at a 
far earlier stage, especially in the case of transport planning in 
Switzerland and Austria on which the Community is so dependent for a 
considerable part of its internal transport. 
The fact that an inadequate procedure has become law does not, 
however, exclude the possibility of the Community applying a more 
effective procedure in special cases and, above all, must not prevent 
the commission from drawing up an overall plan for the Alpine passes, 
bearing in mind that they affect the major lines of communication in 
France, Italy and Germany which often find themselves competing. This 
.. / .. 
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is an additional reason to intervene and contribute to a definite 
. organization of competition between the various traffic links in the 
context of an overall plan based on accurately estimated costs and 
benefits to the whole economy, assessed in relation not only to transport 
but also to its effects on the general development of the Alpine region 
and regional development throughout the Community. 
When viewed in this light it is clear that the question is not 
primarily one of undertaking particularly large expenditure to favour 
some areas but rather of intervening in the interest of the Community's 
entire regional structure. 
The basic concept of the European Economic Community is the achievement 
of more rational production by creating a larger market. This involves 
larger enterprises and restructuring the European economic area. 
However, a larger market can only arise if trade is physically possible, 
i.e. if not only customs barriers but also traffic barriers are eliminated. 
The barrier presented to traffic by the Alps hampers the exchange of 
goods between the large areas of industrial concentration of the Community 
and Italy, the very country in the community which lags furthest behind 
in development and prosperity and suffers most from structural unemploy-
ment. Although it is true that some of the smaller industries live off 
a local market and are thus not affected by transport costs, it is obvious 
that reduction in these resulting from improvement of Alpine routes would 
benefit the development of Italy as a whole. Such a favourable develop-
ment south of the Alps would in turn open up new markets and create new 
incentives for further development of the economy north of the Alps. 
It is the declared policy of the community to transfer industries 
from zones of excessive concentration in the north-west, which attract 
an increasing amount of foreign labour, to the south, which still suffers 
from structural unemployment. That industry should be brought to the 
people and not people to industry, is the Community's motto. 
But this policy too is hampered by the barrier of transport costs. 
A firm based in the north-west of Eu:ro pe which contemplates setting up 
a branch in the Mediterranean area will have to take transport costs 
very closely into account in its plans. The more infrastructures are 
extended, the greater will be the savings in time and money and the more 
inclined firms will be to move to the south. 
Such transfers of industry result not only in an exchange of goods 
but frequently also in intensive passenger traffic between the different 
branches of undertakings. The time factor is often a vital one for the 
journeys of engineers, skilled workers, accountants and auditors • 
. . / .. 
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For the tourist,too, time is a factor to be considered alongside 
cost. The increasing flow of tourists travelling south from northern 
countries in search of sun and recreation consists more and more of 
people with limited time at their disposal. The barrier presented by 
the Alps becomes an ever worsening problem, particularly when hour-long 
traffic jams become a regular occurrence during the peak holiday season. 
However much the Conununity, as an outward-looking community, must 
bear in mind the welfare of neighbouring third countries, it is nonethe-
less clear that of all the Mediterranean areas which benefit alike from 
tourism and the relocation of industry, Italy is put at particular 
disadvantage by the barrier presented by the Alps. For. all these reasons, 
the question of Alpine crossings is an important one for the Community's 
regional policy. 
* Senator Luigi Noe'was born in Milan. A graduate in engineering 
and agriculture, his speciality is the hydro-electric sector, in ~hich 
he has designed plant in Italy and South America. From 1961 to 1966 he 
was a member of the CD Provincial Committee in Milan; he was elected to 
the Senate in 1968. Until then, Senator Noe'was a director of Montedison. 
He is also President of ICEPS (Institute for economic cooperation with 
developing countries). He has been a member of the European Parliament 
since 1969. 
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